A strong representation of a committee, formalized as a simple game, on a convex and closed set of alternatives is a game form with the members of the committee as players such that (i) the winning coalitions of the simple game are exactly those coalitions, which can get any given alternative independent of the strategies of the complement, and (ii) for any profile of continuous and convex preferences, the resulting game has a strong Nash equilibrium. In the paper, it is investigated whether committees have representations on convex and compact subsets of R m . This is shown to be the case if there are vetoers; for committees with no vetoers the existence of strong representations depends on the structure of the alternative set as well as on that of the committee (its Nakamura-number). Thus, if A is strictly convex, compact, and has smooth boundary, then no committee can have a strong representation on A. On the other hand, if A has non-smooth boundary, representations may exist depending on the Nakamura-number (if it is at least 7).
Introduction
The study of committee decision making in political and economic environments has been the subject of many investigations since Black (1948) . At this point we shall only mention Arrow (1951) , Moulin (1980) , Barberà and Peleg (1990) , Zhou (1991) , and Barberà, Gül, and Stachetti (1994) . For a recent survey of closely related work the reader is referred to Sprumont (1995) . Black (1948) and Arrow (1951) introduced the class of single-peaked preferences on the real line. For this class of preferences, the analysis of the decision making of a simple majority committee leads to the median voter rule. This rule is (coalitionally) strategy-proof, anonymous, and Pareto efficient. In Moulin (1980) all voting rules (on the class of single peaked preference profiles) which are strategy-proof, anonymous, and efficient, have been characterized. Moulin's work has been refined by several authors (see Sprumont (1995) ), so that now committee decision making on (a closed convex subset of) the real line with single-peaked preferences is fully understood (see also Section 8 in the present paper).
Clearly, assuming that choice set is one-dimensionsional is very restrictive. In many real-life problems we have to deal with several issues simultaneously or allocate the budget to several projects. However, the problem of extending Moulin's results to higher dimensions remained open till Zhou (1991) . In his paper, Zhou generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (see Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) ) to economies with pure public goods. In terms of the theory of committee decision making, Zhou's result can be described as follows: Let A be a closed and convex subset of R m , m ≥ 2, and let the dimension of A be m. Further, let G be a nondictatorial commitee (i.e., G is a non-dictatorial (monotonic and proper) simple game), and let f be a social choice function which has the following properties: (i) f induces the same power structure (among the players) as G, (ii) f is defined for (profiles of) continuous and convex preferences (on A). Then (under all the foregoing assumptions), f is manipulable.
The work of Zhou (1991) is the starting point of our investigation. Our method for finding satisfactory voting rules for pure public goods economies can be described in the following way. Let G = (N, W ) be a committee, and let A be a convex and compact subset of R m of full dimension m, for m ≥ 2. The pair (G, A) will be called a choice problem. The core of a choice problem (G, A) with respect to a profile ∼ N of preferences is defined in the usual way (see our Section 2 below). We mainly consider stable choice problems, that is, choice problems (G, A) such that the core C(G, A, ∼ N ) = ∅ for every profile ∼ N of continuous and convex preferences. We remark that if G is weak (i.e., G contains at least one vetoer), then (G, A) is stable (for every compact set A). For a non-weak committee G, (G, A) is stable iff m ≤ ν(G) − 2, where ν(G) is the number of G (see Greenberg (1979) and Le Breton (1987) ). Now, let (G, A) be a stable choice problem. We ask whether there exists a game form Γ with the following properties: (i) Γ (partially) implements the core C(G, A, ·) on the (restricted) domain of continuous and convex preferences in strong Nash equilibria;
(ii) the power structure induced by Γ on N (i.e., the set of members of G), is equal to G.
If a game form Γ satisfies the foregoing conditions (i) and (ii) with respect to a (stable) choice problem (G, A), then we say that Γ is a strong representation of G on A. In this paper we study the existence of strong representations of choice problems. Our study is motivated by the following two claims:
(a) A strong representation of a choice problem (G, A) is a satisfactory (generalized) voting procedure that enables the committee G to choose a member of A.
(b) There exist important families of choice problems which have strong representations.
We shall now elaborate on these two claims. Let (G, A) be a choice problem, and let Γ be a strong representation of G on A. As Γ is a game form, it may be considered as a generalized voting procedure for G (the ordinary voting procedures are given by social choice functions). Indeed, quite a few voting rules are given by game forms; approval voting is a well-known example. In addition, each voting game that is induced by Γ (in conjunction with a profile of continuous and convex preferences) has a strong Nash equilibrium. This strong stability property is not implied, for example, by the existence of equilibrium in dominant strategies. Finally, Γ truly reflects the power structure represented by G.
In order to justify claim (b) we shall mention two of our results: (1) If G is weak, then (G, A) has a strong representation for every A (that satisfies our assumptions); (2) assume that A = R m and that m ≤ ν(G) − 2. If we restrict ourselves to continuous and convex preferences which are also bounded (i.e., the upper level sets are bounded; see Section 3), then (G, A) has a strong representation. We remark that preferences which are derived from a weighted Euclidean distance (see Enelow and Hinich (1984) ), are bounded.
We can now summarize our approach: Using the nonemptiness of the core of a choice problem (G, A), we find strongly stable (generalized) voting procedures for G (i.e., procedures which are stable when combined with continuous and convex preferences on A). The manipulability problem is avoided because we use game forms (and not social choice functions). However, as expected, the voting games induced by our game forms are not solvable by dominant strategies; nevertheless, they have strong Nash equilbria.
Earlier works on existence of strong representations for committees considered choice problems with a finite set of alternatives. The following is a (partial) list of contributions to the theory of representation: Peleg (1978a Peleg ( ),(1978b Peleg ( ),(1984 , Dutta and Pattanaik (1978) , Ishikawa and Nakamura (1980 ), and Holzman (1986a ),(1986b .
These works proved existence of strong representations by social choice functions, whereas we only prove strong representation by game forms. We have to enlarge the set of possible representations because of the complexity of the representation problem in the continuous case. Indeed, we obtained some impossibility results for (the larger set of) game forms. Finally, we should mention the close relationship between representation theory and implementation in strong Nash equilibria (see Moulin and Peleg (1982) and Maskin (1985) for results on implementation by strong Nash equilibria).
We now briefly review the contents of this paper. Section 2 is devoted to definitions and notations. Existence of strong representations for spatial voting games is proved in Section 3. Choice problems for committees with vetoers are considered in Section 4, where it is proved that all such problems have strong representations. In Section 5, we state and prove the first impossibility result (Theorem 5.2) which may be formulated as follows: Let A ⊂ R 2 be strictly convex, compact, and smooth, and let G be a committee without vetoers. Then G has no strong representation on A. This result can be generalized to higher dimensions (see Theorem 5.3). Small Nakamura numbers are considered in Section 6. If (G, A) is a choice problem and ν(G) ≤ 6, then G has no strong representation on A. The first case which is not excluded by our impossibility theorems is G = (7, 6) (i.e., a special majority of 6 out of 7) and A is the (two-dimensional) standard unit simplex in R 3 (notice that ν(G) = 7 and A is not strictly convex). It is solved in full detail in Section 7. Finally, the classical case of dimension 1 is briefly discussed in Section 8. A general result, extending the basic result of Moulin and Peleg (1982) on representation of effectivity functions with finite sets of alternatives to effectivity functions with infinitely many alternatives, is used at several occassions to prove existence of representations. This result is stated and proved in an appendix.
Definitions and notations
Let A be a set of alternatives. Throughout this paper, excluding the appendix, A is a closed and convex subset of a Euclidean space R m , m ≥ 1. We always assume that A is of dimension m. A preference ordering on A is a complete and transitive binary relation. We denote by P the set of all preference orderings on A. ∼ ∈ P is continuous if for each x ∈ A, the sets {y ∈ A | y ∼ x} and {y ∈ A | x ∼ y} are closed. We denote by P c the set of all continuous preference orderings on A. ∼ ∈ P is convex if for each x ∈ A the set {y ∈ A | y ∼ x} is convex. We denote by P cc the set of all continuous and convex preference orderings. Finally, if ∼ ∈ P, then its asymmetric part is defined by
Let D be a set. We denote by P (D) the set of all subsets of D, that is,
\{∅} is the set of all non-empty subsets of D.
Let A be a set of alternatives and let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of players. An effectivity function (EF) is a function E : P (N ) → P (P (A)) that satisfies the following conditions;
Let E be an EF. E is superadditive if it satisfies the following condition:
The core of E with respect to ∼ N ∈ P N is defined in the following way: Let B ∈ 2 A , S ∈ 2 N , and 
Let Γ = (Σ 1 , . . . , Σ n ; π; A) be a GF and let S ∈ 2 N . We denote
We remark that E Γ α is superadditive, and E Γ β is maximal (see, e.g., Abdou and Keiding (1991) ).
Let Γ = (Σ 1 , . . . , Σ n ; π; A) be a GF and let ∼ N ∈ P N . The pair (Γ, ∼ N ) defines, in an obvious way, a game in strategic form. We denote
We remark that if σ is an SNE of (Γ,
. . , Σ n ; π; A) be a GF and let E : P (N) → P (P (A)) be an EF. Γ (partially) implements the core C(E,
is the set of SNE's of the game (Γ, ∼ N )). Finally, we recall some properties of simple games. A simple game is a pair (N, W ), where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of players, and W ⊂ 2 N is a set of winning
We only deal with monotonic and proper simple games. Let, again,
V is the set of vetoers of G. If G is not weak, then the Nakamura number of G, ν(G), is given by
(see Nakamura (1979) ). Let G = (N, W ) be a simple game, let A be a set of alternatives, let ∼ N ∈ P N , and let x, y ∈ A. x dominates y at ∼ N if there exists S ∈ W such that x i y for all i ∈ S. The core of G with respect to ∼ N , C(G, ∼ N ), is the set of all undominated alternatives at ∼ N . Assume now that A is a compact and convex subset of R m , the dimension of A is m, and G is not weak. Then C(G, Le Breton (1987) ). Let E : P (N ) → P (P (A)) be an EF. The simple game (N, W E ) which is associated with E is given by
E is an extension of the simple game (N,
. . , Σ n ; π; A) be a GF. The simple game which is associated with Γ is G
Implementation of the core of spatial voting games
In this section we consider a particular class of choice problems (G, A), namely such where the set of alternatives is Euclidean space of some dimension m and where the preferences are bounded in the sense that at each a ∈ A, the set of alternatives which are at least as good as a is a bounded set. The literature on spatial voting problems, see e.g. Enelow and Hinich (1984) , treats particular cases of such decision problems; we use the term spatial voting games for the entire class.
, and bounded. A preference relation ∼ ∈ P cc = P cc (A) is bounded if for each x ∈ A the set {y ∈ A | y x} is bounded. We denote by P ccb the set of bounded preferences in
is a proper and monotonic simple game, N = {1, . . . , n}, and 
A , the set of non-empty subsets of A; if S ⊂ N, S = ∅, and N \S ∈ W , then E(S) = {A}; further, we put E(∅) = ∅, and finally, if S ⊂ N is blocking, that is S, N \S / ∈ W, then
Thus, if S is blocking and B
We claim that E is superadditive and satisfies condition (CC) of Theorem A.
To check superadditivity, let S,
. Thus assume that both S and T are not winning. If S or T are losing, then again B 1 ∩ B 2 ∈ E(S ∪ T ) by the monotonicity of E. Hence it remains to consider the possibility that both S and T are blocking. In this case there are
* is open, convex, and bounded, and
, and x ∈ A. We should prove that (1) 
We may now apply Theorem A to obtain a GF Γ = (
Remark 3.2 Theorem 3.1 can be generalized in two directions: (i) It is possible to replace R m by a closed, convex, and unbounded subset of R m .
(ii) P ccb may be replaced by P cb , the set of continuous and bounded preferences over R m .
Representations of weak games
In this and the following sections, we consider choice problems (G, A) for which A is a convex and compact subset of some Euclidean space. In the present section, we consider the case where the game is weak, that is there is a vetoer. It will be shown that in this case the representation problem has a solution for all convex and compact sets of alternatives A. Thus, let A be a convex and compact subset of R m , m ≥ 1. Assume that aff(A) = R m (here, aff(A) is the affine hull of A). 
Hence, Γ partially implements the core C(G, ·).
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We define an EF E that extends G by the following rules: 
This completes the definition of E.
if S ⊂ N is blocking and 1 /
∈ S, then domination of a ∈ A via S is impossible due to the convexity of preferences, since Pr(S, ∼ N , a) is convex and does not contain a, and S is not effective for any set B for which conv(B) = A. Thus, every alternative in
by the monotonicity of E. Finally, if both S 1 and S 2 are blocking, then B 1 ∩ B 2 ∈ E(S 1 ∪ S 2 ) by (4.1) and (4.2).
Finally, we check that E satisfies (CC) (see Theorem A).
3) is true, Thus, let S be blocking; (4.3) now follows from (4.1) and (4.2). By Theorem A there exists a GF Γ = (Σ 1 , . . . , Σ n ; π; A) such that
. By (4.4), Γ is strongly consistent, because E is stable. Finally, by (4.5),(4.1),(4.2), and the proof of Theorem A,
The core of a weak game may not be (fully) implementable in SNE's by strong representations. This is shown by the following example. 1) . Consider now the following profile:
As the reader may check, C(E
However, this contradicts the SNE-consistency of Γ.
Strictly convex sets of alternatives
For games without vetoers, the structure of the set A will matter for the existence of a strong representation on A of a committee G. Indeed, in the present section we show that if the set A is strictly convex and has a smooth boundary, then (G, A) has no strong representation. We start by treating the special case of m = 2; the impossibility result derived in this context may then be extended to an impossibility result for arbitrary dimension m.
Let A ⊂ R 2 be a convex and compact set of alternatives. We assume that aff(A) = R 2 . Let G = (N, W ) be a proper and monotonic simple game. Furthermore, let Γ = (Σ 1 , . . . , Σ n ; A; π) be a strong representation of G, that is, Γ is SNE-consistent and
N is almost winning with respect to Γ if for every x ∈ bdA and every ε > 0, {y ∈ A | y − x < ε} ∈ E Γ α (S) (here, bd A is the boundary of A). We now recall that a (proper) face of A is a set F ⊂ bdA, F = ∅, with the following property: There exist p ∈ R 2 \{0} and α ∈ R such that
(if a face is a singleton, then it consists of an exposed point). Using this term we can now introduce our last (new) concept in this section: A coalition S ∈ 2 N is weakly winning with respect to Γ if every open neighborhood of every face of A is in E Γ α (S). Throughout the rest of this section we assume that A is smooth, that is, at each x ∈ bdA, A has a unique tangent.
The following lemma uses all the concepts introduced previously: (ii) F is an interval (with positive length).
We shall deal only with case (ii) (the proof in case (i) is similar to that of case (ii)).
We also can choose q 1 , q 2 ∈ R 2 \{0} with the following properties:
Therefore U ∈ E Γ α (T ). Lemma 5.1 has an important corollary. First we recall that A is strictly convex if for all x, y ∈ A, x = y, and all 0 < α < 1, αx Proof: Assume, on the contrary, that G has a strong representation Γ on A. If S ∈ 2 N is weakly winning with respect to Γ, then S is almost winning, because every x ∈ bd A is an exposed point of A. Thus, by Lemma 5.1, the intersection of two almost winning coalitions is almost winning. Now every S ∈ W is winning with respect to Γ, since G 
ThenÂ is strictly convex, compact, and smooth. Furthermore aff (Â) is two-dimensional. Now, define a GFΓ onÂ bŷ Γ = (Σ 1 , . . . , Σ n ; p • π;Â), and letĜ = GΓ α . By our assumption, G Γ α = G. Hence, ifĜ = (N,Ŵ ), thenŴ ⊃ W . Thus,Ĝ has no vetoers. Also, by its definition, G is proper and monotonic. We shall conclude the proof by showing thatΓ is SNE-consistent.
Let (u i (x, y, 0)) i∈N , be a utility profile forΓ, that is, each u i is continuous and quasi-concave onÂ. Let v i (x, y, z) = u i (x, y, 0) for all (x, y, z) ∈ A and i ∈ N . Then v N is a utility profile for Γ. Thus, the game (Γ, v N ) has an SNE. Moreover, as
Thus, Γ is SNE-consistent. Therefore,Γ is a strong representation ofĜ, contradicting Theorem 5.2.
An impossibility result for small Nakamura numbers
The choice problems (G, A) considered in the previous section do not exhaust the possibilities for choice problems with no strong representation. We show in this section that if the Nakamura number of G is less than 6, then no strong representation exists; this impossibility result holds for general convex and compact sets of alternatives.
Let A ⊂ R 2 be a convex and compact set, let aff(A) = R 2 , and let G = (N, W ) be a proper and monotonic simple game. We will prove in this section the following impossibility result: If ν(G) ∈ {4, 5, 6}, then G has no strong representation on A. We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 6.1 Let A ⊂ R 2 be convex and compact, let aff(A) = R 2 , let G = (N, W ) be a proper and monotonic simple game, and let the GF Γ = (Σ 1 , . . . , Σ n ; π; A) be a strong representation of G. If S 1 , S 2 ∈ W , then T = S 1 ∩ S 2 is weakly winning with respect to Γ.
Proof: Let F ⊂ bdA be a (proper) face of A and let U be an open set (in A) containing F . We shall prove that U ∈ E Γ α (T ). Let a ∈ F . There exists p ∈ R 2 \{0} such that
Clearly, there exists δ > 0 such that
We now choose a convex, compact, and smooth setÂ such that
(ii) a ∈ bdÂ and the line p · x = p · a is tangent toÂ at a.
UsingÂ we define two utility functions in the following way: Let x i ∈ intA ∩ intÂ, i = 1, 2, such that a, x 1 , and x 2 are not on the same line. Denote by ·;Â, x i , i = 1, 2, the gauge determined byÂ with center x i , that is
Then we define u i (y) = − y;Â, x i , i = 1, 2.
Consider now the utility profile u N , where
(ii) u i (y) = u 1 (y), i ∈ S 1 \T , and As the reader may check, C(G,
has an SNE σ because Γ is SNE-consistent. Clearly,
Hence, for every µ
Therefore, U ∈ E Γ α (T ). We proceed with the following result. Proof: Assume, on the contrary, that T 1 ∩ T 2 ∩ T 3 = ∅. We shall prove that there exists
= ∅, and thereby we arrive at the desired contradiction. Two cases must be distinguished:
(a) A is strictly convex. Let x i , i = 1, 2, 3, be three distinct points of bd A.
Now define a utility profile u N by
Denote by H k the convex cone spanned by
is an exposed point of A and T i is weakly winning), and
Finally, let i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, i = j. By strict convexity of A there exists an exposed point x j near x j such that
Here two subcases must be distinguished:
(b.1) x 1 and x 2 are exposed points of A. Let x 3 be a third exposed point of A (here we use the assumption that aff (A) = R 2 ). Now we choose three linear utility functions in the following way. Let q 2 ∈ R 2 satisfy
It is possible now to choose y ∈ bd A near x 3 on the arc of bd A that connects x 1 and x 3 (and does not contain x 2 ) such that
(see Figure 6 .2). Again, we may choose z ∈ bd A near x 2 such that
Finally, choose q 3 ∈ R 2 such that
As in case (a) we define a utility profile u N by (6.1). As the reader may check, the following three open sets,
We can choose exposed points x 1 , x 2 of A near x 1 and x 2 , respectively, such that Now choose q 1 ∈ R 2 such that
Clearly, if x 2 is sufficiently close to x 2 , then
Again, we may choose x 1 , x 2 , q 1 and q 3 such that q 3 · x 2 > q 3 · w. We now define u N and H i , i = 1, 2, 3, as in the case (b.1) and obtain, again, that
The main result of this section can now be proved. Proof: As in Section 5, it is sufficient to consider the case m = 2. Assume now, on the contrary, that G has a strong representation Γ on A. As ν(G) ≤ 6, there exist three weakly winning coalitions with respect to Γ, T 1 , T 2 and T 3 , such that T 1 ∩ T 2 ∩ T 3 = ∅ (see Lemma 6.1). By Lemma 6.2 we obtain the desired contradiction.
Notice that the only new cases which are excluded by Theorem 6.3 are: m = 2, ν(G) ∈ {4, 5, 6}, m = 3, ν(G) ∈ {5, 6}, and m = 4 and ν(G) = 6. In all other cases impossibility is implied by Le Breton (1987) .
A game with no vetoers that has a strong representation
In the light of the impossibility results obtained in the previous sections, one might be tempted to believe that impossibility hold generally, that is for all choice problems (G, A) where G has no vetoers. It is shown in this section that this is not the case; indeed we find a strong representation of the game (7, 6) on a particular set of alternatives, namely the standard simplex in R 3 , and the method can be applied to give a strong representation of any game (n, n − 1) on this set alternatives.
Let X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } be a set of three affinely independent points in R 2 , let A = conv(X) (the convex hull of X), and let G = (N, W ) = (7, 6), that is, N = {1, . . . , 7} and
We shall prove that G has a strong representation on A.
Define an EF E : P (N ) → P (P (A)) as follows: For S ⊂ N , let
As the reader may check, E is superadditive and maximal. We shall prove that E is stable, that is, C(E, ∼ N ) = ∅ for every ∼ N ∈ P N cc . Let ∼ N ∈ P N cc and let u i : A → R be a representation of ∼ i for each i ∈ N . Without loss of generality, min x∈A u i (x) = 0 for all i ∈ N . We define now an NTU game (N, V ) by
We shall prove that the core of V , C(N, V ), is nonempty. Clearly, this will imply that C(E, ∼ N ) = ∅ and complete the proof of the stability of E. We now observe that if 3 ≤ |S| ≤ 5, then V (S) is a union of three corners, that is S and obtain a new game (N,V ). Observe that (7.1) min
(u i is quasiconcave for i ∈ N and min x∈A u i (x) = 0). Hence, for |S| = 3, 4,V (S) is a union of at most two corners (where one of them is determined by 0 S ). Similarly, if |S| = 5, thenV (S) is the union of at most three corners, and one of them is determined by 0 S (in the foregoing discussion we did not distinguish between a corner {y ∈ R N | y S ≤ c S } and the vector c S ). We remark that C(N, V ) = C(N,V ) (V (S) = V (S) for |S| / ∈ {3, 4, 5}). We shall prove that C(N,V ) = ∅ by showing that (N,V ) is balanced. Thus, let B ⊂ 2 N be a balanced collection with balancing weights (λ S ) S∈B , and let
We must show thatȳ ∈V (N ) (= V (N)).
Then A i is a nonempty convex set for each i ∈ N . Also, ifȳ i ≤ 0, then A i = A. We shall prove the following claim.
If there exists S ∈ B such that S ⊃ S + , then Lemma 7.1 is true. Therefore, we shall assume in the sequel:
There exists no S ∈ B such that S ⊃ S + .
The following result will be used in the proof of Lemma 7.1.
Lemma 7.2 If the following condition is satisfied,
then there exists S ∈ B such that i 1 , i 2 ∈ S and |S | = 5.
Proof of Lemma 7.2: Assume, on the contrary, that there exists no S ∈ B such that i 1 , i 2 ∈ S and |S | = 5. Let T = N \S and for each j, j = 1, 2, 3, let
where, by convention,
. By (7.2) and (7.3),
Also, by (all) the foregoing assumptions, there exists j ∈ T such that
We now consider the following possibilities: (a) a 1 = a 2 = b 1 = b 2 = c 3 = 0: In this case N \{i 3 } is the unique set of B which contains i 1 and i 2 . Also, as c 3 = 0 andȳ i 3 > 0, there exists S ∈ B such that i 3 ∈ S and 3 ≤ |S | ≤ 5. As S ∩ (N \{i 3 }) = ∅, this contradicts the balancedness of B. Thus, (a) is impossible.
(b) a 1 + a 2 + b 1 + b 2 + c 3 > 0: By (7.4) and (7.5),
Hence, (b) is also impossible, and the desired contradiction has been obtained. We conclude that there exists S ∈ B such that |S | = 5 and i 1 , i 2 ∈ S .
We shall now prove Lemma 7.1.
Proof of Lemma 7.1: Let T = {S ∈ B | |S | ∈ {3, 4}}. We say that i ∈ S is covered by T if there exists S ∈ T such that i ∈ S . We distinguish the following possibilities: (a) Every i ∈ S + is covered by T : Here, we further have to consider the following subcases:
(a.1) There exist two sets S 1 , S 2 ∈ T such that S 1 ∪ S 2 ⊃ S + : We have for each j two extreme points x j,1 , x j,2 such that
2) There exist three sets S j in T such that {i j } = S + ∩ S j , j = 1, 2, 3: Again, for each j there exist two extreme points x j,1 , x j,2 , such that
Without loss of generality j 1 = 1 and j 2 = 2. Let k ∈ S 1 ∩ S 2 . Then
Therefore, by (7.1), {x 1,1 , x 1,2 } = {x 2,1 , x 2,2 }. As {x 1,1 , x 1,2 } ∩ {x 3,1 , x 3,2 } = ∅, we have that ∩ i∈S A i = ∅.
(b) Only two members of S + , say i 1 and i 2 , are covered by T : There exist S 1 , S 2 ∈ T such that i j ∈ S + ∩ S j , j = 1, 2 (S 1 = S 2 is not excluded). Thus, i 3 ∈ S + ∩ S for some S ∈ B with |S | ≥ 5. We distinguish the following subcases: (b.1) There exists S ∈ B such that i 3 ∈ S and |S | = 5: There is an extreme point x such that u
We have u k (x) > 0 by the construction ofV . By (7.1) and the definition ofV ,
2) i 3 ∈ S ∈ B ⇒ |S | = 6: By (7.2), i 3 is contained in at most two members S of B with |S | = 6. Let these coalitions be T 1 and T 2 (where T 1 = T 2 is possible).
(c) Only one member of S + , say i 1 , is covered by T : By Lemma 7.2 there exists S ∈ B such that i 2 , i 3 ∈ S and |S | = 5. Without loss of generality i 2 ∈ S + . There is an extreme point x such that u i 2 (x) ≥ȳ i 2 > 0, and
> 0 by the definition ofV . By (7.1) and the definition ofV ,
+ is covered by T : By Lemma 7.2 and (7.2) there exist three coalitions S j ∈ B such that |S j | = 5 and S j ⊃ S + \{i j } for j = 1, 2, 3. For each j there exists an extreme point z j such that
Hence, by (7.1), there exist j 1 , j 2 ∈ {1, 2, 3}, j 1 = j 2 , such that z j 1 = z j 2 . Clearly, z j 1 ∈ ∩ i∈S A i .
Now we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 7.3 (N, V ) has a nonempty core.
Proof: Using the previous notation it is sufficient to prove that (N,V ) is balanced. By Lemma 7.1 and Helly's Theorem (see Rockafellar (1970) , Theorem 21.6)), Theorem 7.4 The game (7, 6 ) has a strong representation on A.
Proof: Using the previous notations we have that the EF E is superadditive, maximal, and stable. By Theorem A in the Appendix there exists a GF Γ = (Σ 1 , . . . , Σ 7 ; π; A) that implements the core of E. As the reader may check, if Γ is constructed according to the proof of Theorem A, then Γ is a strong representation of (7, 6).
The following generalization of Theorem 7.4 is true:
Theorem 7.5 Let X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } be a set of three affinely independent points in R 2 , let A = conv(X), and let G = (n, n − 1), n ≥ 7. Then G has a strong representation on A.
Proof: Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players of G. Further, let n 1 = n 3 + 1, n 2 = 2n 3 + 1,
Define an EF E : P (N ) → P (P (A)) by the following rules: For S ⊂ N , let
As the reader may check, E is superadditive and maximal. For the rest of the proof of this theorem, the reader should precisely follow the steps of the proof of Theorem 7.4 (with obvious changes in the notation). We have checked that the details remain valid.
The case m = 1
The last class of choice problems to be considered in this paper is that consisting of choice problems (G, A) with A a convex and compact subset of one-dimensional Euclidean space, that is an interval on the real line, where the strong representation problem always has a solution.
Let A = [a,ā], a <ā, be an interval, and let G = (N, W ) be a proper and monotonic simple game. For the sake of completeness we shall indicate how to implement the core C(G; A;
If G is not strong, then the core C(G, ·) is a set-valued function. Therefore we need to construct a special GF, albeit simple, to implement the core. Proof: Let Σ i = A for every i ∈ N , and let
π is the well-known committee rule (for the committee G). The reader is referred to Barberà, Gul and Stachetti (1994) for a study of committee rules. Let Γ = (Σ 1 , . . . , Σ n ; π; A). We first check that
A . Now, let S ∈ 2 N \W , and let a ≤ x <ā. Then S is not α-effective for x. Thus, G Γ α = G, and for every
It remains to prove that Γ is SNE-consistent. Let ∼ N ∈ P N cc . Define the "right peak" of i by p
and let
Concluding remarks
In this section we first summarize the main results of our work, and then comment on possible future continuations. We start with a formulation of a result which is implied by Zhou (1991) . Let A be a convex and compact subset of R m , m ≥ 2, let aff(A) = R m , and let G = (N, W ) be a non-dictatorial committee (that is {i} / ∈ W for all i ∈ N , and N ∈ W ; thus, in particular, n ≥ 2). Further, let f : P N cc → A be a social choice function, and let G f α = G (notice that G f α is well defined because f is a GF). Then f is manipulable (the reader may notice that every representation of G is surjective, because N ∈ W ). Thus, the choice problem (G, A) has no strategy-proof representations. However, we have shown that when (G, A) is stable (that is the core C(G, A, ∼ N ) = ∅ for all profiles ∼ N of continuous and convex preferences), it may be possible to (partially) implement the core of G, and thereby obtain a strongly stable representation of G on A.
We have obtained the following results on the existence of strongly stable representations of committees in economic environments. Let G = (N, W ) be a committee with N ∈ W , and let A be a closed convex subset of R m , m ≥ 2, with aff(A) = R m . (i) If G contains a vetoer and A is (in addition) compact, then G has a strong representation on A.
(ii) If A = R m , preferences are bounded, and ν(G) − 2 ≥ m, then strong representations exist.
(iii) If A is compact, smooth, and strictly convex, and G has no vetoers, then strong representations do not exist.
(iv) If A is (in addition) compact and ν(G) ≤ 6, then there are no strong representations.
(v) Every symmetric game (n, n − 1), n ≥ 7, has a strong representation on the standard simplex in R 3 . We remark that, in our view, (i) and (ii) are important and useful results. Clearly, (iii) and (iv) impose restrictions on our method. However, (v) shows that if the Nakamura number of a committee exceeds 6 and the set of alternatives is not strictly convex, then strong representations may exist (even when there are no vetoers). The general problem of existence of strong representations of committees (without vetoers) on polyhedral sets of alternatives is left as a subject for future research.
We conclude with some comments on the complexity of our GF's. Let (G, A) be a stable choice problem. We construct a strong representation of G on A by the following two-stage procedure: (I) We first check whether G can be extended to a superadditive, maximal, and stable EF E; and (II) if an extension E can be found, then we implement the core of E in SNE's, and thereby obtain the desired representation. We now remark that in the results (i), (ii), and (v) mentioned above, the definition of the extending EF was simple and intuitive. Furthermore, in Theorem A, which was applied at stage (II), the definition of the implementing GF is relatively simple. Thus, in all the above three cases, our GF's are explicitly defined in an uncomplicated and intuitively acceptable way.
Appendix: Implementing the core of an EF on a restricted domain
In this appendix, we state and prove a general result on implementation of effectivity functions when there are restrictions on the set of admissible preferences.
Let N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, be a set of voters and let A be a set of alternatives (with at least two members). Further, let A be a feasible sets structure on A, that is A ⊂ P (A), and ∅, A ∈ A. We denote A 0 = A\∅. Also, we assume that {a} ∈ A for all a ∈ A. Let P be a set of complete and transitive binary relations on A. P specifies our restrictions on the preferences of the players. Finally, let E : P (N ) → P (A 0 ) be an EF. In order to formulate our result we need the following notation. Let S ⊂ N , S = ∅, let ∼ N ∈ P N , and let a ∈ A. We denote Pr(S, ∼ N , a) = {y ∈ A | y i a for all i ∈ S}.
Now we can formulate our result. Thus, π(σ N \T , µ T ) ∈ A\Pr(T, ∼ N , a), and σ is an SNE. Clearly, by the definition of Γ, E Γ α (S) ⊃ E(S) for all S ∈ P (N ) (notice that E is monotonic with respect to the players). Hence,
Thus, π(SNE(Γ, ∼ N )) = C(E, ∼ N ) for all ∼ N ∈ P N .
